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Introduction: New Zealand’s natural capital
New Zealand’s cultural, social and economic 
prospects are inextricably intertwined with the health 
and sustenance of our natural capital.
Our natural resources are central to 
New Zealand’s cultural heritage, both for 
Päkehä and Mäori. Mäori draw identity 
and whakapapa from the environment and 
exercise kaitiaki responsibilities over land 
and resources. We have a responsibility 
to recognise this cultural relationship 
in accordance with the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi.
Natural resources such as land, water 
and fish provide a large proportion of the 
inputs to our economic system in 2011:
• export in 2011, export revenue from 
the primary industries amounted 
to over $31.5 billion or over 70% of 
total merchandise export revenue 
(Ministry for Primary Industries, 
2011);
• agriculture and primary industries 
contribute dover 17% to our gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2011);
• over 70% of our electricity was 
generated by renewable energies 
(Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment, 2013).
New Zealand is wealthy in natural 
resources. We have plentiful, clean water; 
clean air; fertile soil and a climate well-
suited to humans, trees, livestock and 
agriculture; long coastlines and significant 
aquaculture resources; significant mineral 
and petroleum reserves; and extraordinary 
biodiversity on our land and in our 
water bodies. The World Bank estimates 
that New Zealand ranks eighth out of 
120 countries and second out of OECD 
countries in natural capital per capita; 
we are outranked only by petroleum-
exporting countries (World Bank, 2011). 
While it is still substantial, natural capital 
in New Zealand has been reduced since 
the arrival of humans, however, including 
losses to our lowland forest and reductions 
in native biodiversity.
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The New Zealand economy has grown 
on the basis of its natural capital stocks 
and flows and our ability to generate 
wealth will be dependent on this stock 
for the foreseeable future.
Strong income growth in emerging 
markets will support demand for natural 
resources in the short to mid-term, 
underpinning demand for New Zealand’s 
exports and reinforcing the importance 
of the productive sectors for our 
growth, wealth and living standards. 
Should we fail to plan to and manage 
within biophysical resource limits we 
will undermine the productivity of our 
primary sector in the long term and limit 
our growth potential. This will in turn 
constrain the government’s ability to 
provide for the needs of a growing and 
ageing population.
Natural capital in the Crown accounts
In New Zealand natural resource stocks 
and flows have both direct and indirect 
impacts on the government’s revenues, 
expenses, assets and liabilities.
Direct impacts
The Crown incurs expenses for natural 
resource management and regulation, 
including the cost of managing public 
conservation areas, regulating fisheries, 
and cleaning up lakes and rivers with 
deteriorating water quality. In limited 
cases the Crown collects revenues from 
natural resources, including royalties 
for petroleum and minerals extraction, 
proceeds from radio spectrum auctions, 
and taxes on petrol and diesel fuels. In 
these instances the Crown has asserted a 
right to manage a resource or regime on 
behalf of all New Zealanders, including the 
redistribution of any accrued economic 
benefits.
The Crown carries liabilities associated 
with natural resources, including 
contingent liabilities for our current 
obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. The 
Crown also possesses a number of natural 
resource-related assets, including physical 
assets such as the conservation estate, 
Crown-owned forestry and agricultural 
assets, and non-physical assets such as 
the stock of international carbon units 
collected through the emissions trading 
scheme (ETS).
Indirect impacts
Given the importance of natural resources 
to our economy, changes in the availability 
or quality of natural resources for extrac-
tion and use will have a significant impact 
on New Zealand’s economic performance, 
which, commodity prices and all else 
being equal, will affect government tax 
revenue. For the same reason, changes to 
resource management and conservation 
policies may have indirect impacts on the 
government’s finances in so far as they 
affect the productivity or profitability of 
resource-dependent sectors. 
Policy options
Some of New Zealand’s resources are 
non-renewable, or finite (e.g. petroleum, 
minerals); in some cases the benefits of 
extracting these resources and the risks 
associated with their extraction may be 
best managed by the Crown on behalf 
of all New Zealanders, including future 
generations. These resources represent 
wealth that New Zealand already holds: 
policies should be aimed at realising those 
assets at a rate and in a manner that will 
provide the greatest return to the economy 
as a whole, over time.1
Some of our resources are conditionally 
renewable, meaning that they become 
degraded, scarce or extinct if they are 
not valued and managed appropriately 
(e.g. fisheries, fresh water); some of our 
resources are unconditionally renewable 
and our actions will not jeopardise or 
otherwise affect their flow of goods 
and services (e.g. solar, tidal energy). 
If the aim is to manage within various 
biophysical limits and protect ecosystem 
values, renewable resource management 
should aim to draw down the resource at 
a rate and in a manner that will not exceed 
the rate at which the resource renews or 
replenishes. In practice, communities may 
choose to manage renewable resources so 
as to protect additional values, such as 
recreational and cultural uses.
In some cases New Zealand may be 
called upon to do its part to manage 
within global biophysical limits for 
natural resources, as we are bound by the 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer.
The goal of natural resource 
management and environmental policy 
is to put in place incentives for efficient 
resource use by communicating the true 
value of those resources where feasible.2 
Advanced natural resource management 
and environmental policies facilitate better 
long-term investment decisions, prevent 
stranded capital, and avoid disputes over 
ownership and governance. Early non-
regulatory policies that build capability 
for measurement and monitoring can 
ease the transition to later regulatory 
policies or market-based mechanisms.
Case studies
The following section of this article 
present three case studies, intended to 
illustrate the diversity of New Zealand’s 
natural resource base and, therefore, the 
challenges we face in designing effective 
management regimes for its sustenance.
Oil and gas
Petroleum already represents a significant 
revenue stream to the Crown, with 
significant upside potential. To maximise 
the benefits of petroleum production, the 
Crown needs to carefully consider fiscal 
terms and ensure robust regulatory settings 
to maximise economic and fiscal benefits 
The goal of natural resource management and 
environmental policy is to put in place incentives 
for efficient resource use by communicating the 
true value of those resources where feasible
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while managing potential environmental 
and health and safety risks.
Introduction
In New Zealand the Crown owns the 
subsurface petroleum resources; any 
company wanting to prospect, explore 
or mine petroleum must obtain a permit 
from New Zealand Petroleum and 
Minerals (NZPAM). In 2011/12 the Crown 
collected $335 million in royalties and 
levies on petroleum, excluding associated 
corporate tax revenue or indirect taxation 
revenue – or 0.2% of GDP. However, 
most of New Zealand’s territory is yet to 
be explored and the potential for further 
development of petroleum resources may 
be significant.
Today all petroleum mining and 
production in New Zealand occurs in 
the Taranaki basin. Gas generated over 
20% of New Zealand’s electricity in 2010 
(Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment, 2012).3 The Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment 
estimates that in 2009 the oil and 
gas industry, including exploration, 
production and the supply chain, directly 
contributed $1.9 billion (1.5%) to national 
GDP (ibid.). In 2011 crude oil was 
New Zealand’s fourth largest merchandise 
export at $2.0 billion, or over 4% of total 
exports (Statistics New Zealand, 2012).
Fiscal sustainability – price
From the Crown perspective, the 
economics of petroleum exploration and 
production depend on three interrelated 
factors: price, quantity and risk.
An optimal taxation regime for 
petroleum is one that is targeted on 
economic rents, related to profits so as to 
allow for cost recovery plus an adequate 
return, and flexible to variations in 
prices and production and operational 
costs (AUPEC, 2009). In New Zealand 
the Crown collects the higher of either 
a 5% royalty on gross revenues or a 20% 
accounting profits royalty. Ultimately, the 
Crown receives approximately 42% of the 
accounting profit from petroleum field 
developments as royalty and company 
tax (Ministry of Economic Development, 
2012b).
A study by AUPEC completed in 2009 
showed that the New Zealand petroleum 
fiscal regime is highly competitive against 
comparator countries, based on data from 
currently producing fields (Aupec, 2009). 
Similarly, the Journal of World Energy and 
Business has ranked New Zealand the 
fourth most fiscally attractive jurisdiction 
between 1998 and 2007 (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2012b). A highly 
competitive royalties and taxation regime 
makes New Zealand more attractive than 
other oil-producing jurisdictions, where 
all other factors, including distance to 
markets, are held constant.
Changes to the fiscal regime for 
petroleum could be reviewed, particularly 
in the event that future discoveries increase 
demand for petroleum exploration in 
New Zealand.
Fiscal sustainability – quantity
Woodward Partners has valued the 
royalties arising from currently producing 
fields and further discoveries based on 
estimates of in-place oil and gas reserves 
and a scenario analysis of commercially 
viable discoveries (Woodward Partners, 
2011).4 The discounted total value between 
2011 and 2050 of the Crown’s royalty 
stream from currently producing fields 
in the oil and gas estate may be estimated 
at $3.2 billion and from potential future 
discoveries at $5.3 billion. The valuation 
of royalties from future discoveries could 
be as low as $1.6 billion and as high as 
$10.3 billion, depending on the assumed 
rate of future industry activity, projected 
petroleum prices and projected exchange 
rates (Woodward Partners, 2011).5
These discounted valuation figures 
veil the potentially significant future 
production and associated real tax 
revenue in the lower probability scenarios 
and should be treated as hypothetical 
only. 
Risk
A high degree of aversion to health, safety 
and environmental risks may effectively 
limit the extent to which resources can be 
discovered and extracted by prescribing 
certain methods that must be used or 
areas where exploration and production 
cannot be undertaken.
Environmental risks
Oil and gas exploration and 
production operations have the 
potential for a variety of impacts 
on the environment, including 
noise; spills, emissions and other 
discharges; site access and footprint; 
socio-economic and cultural issues; 
and interference with other resource 
users. Offshore, where the majority 
of New Zealand’s potential oil fields 
lie, exploratory operations may 
harm benthic and pelagic organisms 
and marine birds and reduce water 
and air quality. Development and 
production processes carry increased 
risks of soil and water contamination 
from spills and leaks and ongoing 
disruption to the local economy 
(E&P Forum and United Nations 
Environment Programme, 1997).
The frequency and severity 
of significant environmental 
disturbances in New Zealand, 
including oil spills, has been low 
historically. According to Maritime 
New Zealand, fewer than ten ‘more 
significant’ marine oil spills have 
occurred in New Zealand since 1990 
and none of these incidents were the 
result of petroleum exploration or 
A highly competitive royalties and taxation  
regime makes New Zealand more attractive than 
other oil-producing jurisdictions, where all other 
factors, including distance to markets, are held 
constant.
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production activities (Maritime New 
Zealand, 2013).
In addition to these more 
localised environmental impacts, 
oil and gas productiuon and use 
emits carbon dioxide (CO2), 
which contributes to climate 
change. Were limits or charges on 
production of greenhouse gases put 
in place globally, demand for oil 
internationally would be expected 
to decrease significantly and we 
would expect that the economic 
attractiveness of prospecting in New 
Zealand would similarly reduce.
Health and safety risks
Workplace health and safety 
legislation plays a key role in 
ensuring that operators prevent 
the uncontrolled release of oil 
and gas at their operations. While 
an uncontrolled release of oil 
and gas can result in substantial 
environmental damage, it can also 
lead to a major accident, resulting 
in multiple injuries and fatalities. 
An external review of New Zealand’s 
health, safety and environmental 
legislation for offshore petroleum 
operations conducted in 2010 
revealed a number of gaps in 
the regulatory framework, the 
majority of which will be addressed 
by the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf Act 
(Environmental Effects) 2012 and 
proposed changes to the health and 
safety provisions under the Crown 
Minerals Act (Atkins Holm Joseph 
Majurey Ltd, 2010).
Economic growth and efficiency
The economic benefits of enhanced 
petroleum exploration and production 
can be observed in terms of GDP, direct 
royalty and taxation returns, more and 
higher-paying jobs, investment, regional 
development and exports.
General equilibrium modelling by 
New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Research has shown that a South Island 
basin development scenario including the 
discovery of ten new oil and gas fields over 
2010–2040 could drive an increase in gross 
national disposable income of 0.77%, and 
in GDP of 1.2% on average per annum. The 
increase in export values results in higher 
income and improved living standards for 
New Zealanders, an improvement in the 
balance of trade, and indirect tax revenues. 
The upside is restricted by a number of 
counterbalancing effects, including an 
appreciation in the exchange rate, which 
could disadvantage competing exporters, 
and an increase in net foreign liabilities 
(Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment, 2012c; Zuccollo and 
Ballingall, 2012).
‘Dutch Disease’ and macroeconomic policy
A significant increase in oil and gas 
production as a result of new discoveries 
can have material impacts on the economy. 
Overall increased wealth can be offset by 
an exchange rate appreciation that reduces 
the competitiveness of other sectors, such 
as import-competing or non-petroleum 
export industries (e.g. manufacturing, 
agriculture, tourism). These effects are 
sometimes collectively referred to as 
‘Dutch Disease’.
The literature suggests that the optimal 
policy response to Dutch Disease effects 
may consist of avoiding pro-cyclicality 
by preventing increased revenues from 
flowing through into tax reductions or 
increased spending; promoting ongoing 
structural reform; and improving 
financial regulation and supervision to 
contain credit booms and asset bubbles 
(Cordon, 2012; Garton, 2012; Magud and 
Sosa, 2010; IMF, 2012; OECD, 2012).
Even the lowest probability scenario 
modelled by Woodward Partners is 
unlikely to be large enough to trigger 
these macroeconomic effects. However, 
in the event of a significant petroleum 
resource discovery New Zealand should 
be prepared to consider such measures.
Equity and distribution
Because they are finite, exhaustible 
resources, the extraction of oil and gas 
entails obvious intergenerational equity 
issues: oil and gas should be produced so 
as to realise the highest returns and those 
maximised returns should benefit current 
and future generations. As explained, these 
characteristics of natural resource rents 
have encouraged many oil-producing 
nations to establish sovereign wealth or 
oil funds, which are designed to manage 
and invest a nation’s wealth accumulated 
through the sale of natural resources, both 
to manage macroeconomic effects and 
the effects of exchange rate appreciation, 
and to distribute both the benefit of oil 
wealth accumulated and the risk of price 
volatility and extraction uncertainty 
across generations.
Fresh water
While New Zealand has a very large 
freshwater resource, the quality and the 
availability of water are deteriorating at 
the regional and catchment level. Once 
regions set objectives and limits for the 
quantity and quality of the water in their 
catchments, it will be important that 
they have the regulatory and legislative 
tools they need to manage within those 
limits and maximise the value they obtain 
from the water available for use. Market-
based mechanisms, such as tradable water 
permits and water charges, may be needed 
in some jurisdictions.
Introduction
Fresh water provides an essential, life-
supporting service to our communities 
The OECD ranks New Zealand fourth among OECD 
countries for volume of fresh water per capita and 
third for water withdrawal as a percentage of gross 
annual availability. We currently extract less than 
5% of the freshwater resource ... 
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and adds significant value to our economy. 
In 2004, charges for water supply by 
local authorities, value-added from 
irrigation, and value-added from water in 
hydroelectric power generation amounted 
to nearly 1.4% of GDP (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2004).
By international standards fresh 
water in New Zealand is both clean and 
plentiful in supply. The OECD ranks 
New Zealand fourth among OECD 
countries for volume of fresh water per 
capita and third for water withdrawal as 
a percentage of gross annual availability. 
We currently extract less than 5% of the 
freshwater resource, primarily drawn 
from surface waters.
Quality
The state of water quality in New 
Zealand’s rivers is highly variable, and 
declining in some places. Rivers in urban 
and rural areas generally have poorer 
water quality compared to rivers in 
native forest. Catchment features, such 
as land cover, climate and geology, have 
a large influence on water quality, which 
highlights the significant contribution of 
non-point sources, such as run-off from 
agriculture, to poor water quality. Water 
quality is degraded in some lowland areas 
of Northland, Auckland, Waikato, the 
east coast of the North Island, Taranaki, 
Manawatu–Wanganui, Canterbury and 
Southland, where nutrients could stimulate 
plants and algae to grow to excessive levels 
in some rivers, lakes and coastal areas.
Quantity
Quantity pressures are generally a 
catchment or regional rather than a 
national issue. In 85% of large catchments 
there is low allocation pressure on the 
available water relative to mean annual 
low flow (MALF); in 8% of catchments, 
current allocations are greater than the 
modelled MALF.6 These allocation bands 
are modelled on consented water use. This 
is an important distinction, as the average 
national actual water use for consumptive 
takes is estimated to be 65% of consented 
volume, meaning that consent holders 
are entitled to use more water under 
their permit than they are actually using 
(Aqualinc, 2010).
In 2009 the government commissioned 
advice from the Land and Water Forum, 
which ran a stakeholder-led collaborative 
process to build a consensus view on 
shared outcomes, goals and long-term 
strategies for fresh water in New Zealand. 
Drawing on the advice of the forum, the 
government introduced a National Policy 
Statement on freshwater management 
in 2011 which directs local government 
to manage water in an integrated and 
sustainable way while providing for 
economic growth within set water quantity 
and quality limits. The government is 
now in the process of further responding 
to the recommendations of the Forum 
and has proposed a number of potential 
reforms to the freshwater management 
system (Ministry for the Environment, 
2013). Later reforms could include 
further central government direction and 
guidance on management approaches, 
including tools to promote efficient use 
and alternative allocation models.
Fiscal sustainability and economic growth 
and efficiency
Coming decades will be characterised 
by increasing water scarcity and reduced 
reliability of water supply and quality in 
key catchments and regions, at the times 
of year and in the places where water is 
in highest demand. Failure to plan for 
these challenges may entail significant 
fiscal costs, in the form of both decreased 
tax revenue from the agriculture sector 
and increased expenses for ex post clean-
up resulting from over-use and under-
management. Since 2008, approximately 
$340 million in Crown funding has been 
committed to the clean-up of just eight 
lakes and rivers.
The OECD has suggested that 
New Zealand continue to encourage 
the development of market-based 
mechanisms where possible to manage the 
supply and quality of fresh water (OECD, 
2013). Market-based policies assign, either 
implicitly or explicitly, a price for water 
or discharge of contaminants that reflects 
supply, economic or full costs associated 
with that use or discharge. These policies 
include quantity-based controls, such as 
trading of water permits, rights or quotas, 
and direct price interventions such as 
water charges, rent taxes or royalties.
The application of market-based tools 
to fresh water will be informed by the 
particular scarcity or quality challenges 
relevant to the locality. A number of 
market-based tools are already being 
employed in New Zealand to manage 
demand and reduce pollution.
Market-based mechanisms for managing 
water quality
There is some experience with market-
based mechanisms for managing water 
quality in New Zealand. To address local 
and national concerns over the potential 
for decreased water quality in Lake 
Taupo, the Waikato Regional Council has 
implemented a cap-and-trade scheme 
for nitrogen discharges in the catchment. 
The scheme aims to reduce total annual 
anthropogenic nitrogen discharges to 
the lake by 20% by 2020; this target will 
largely be accomplished through the buy-
back of nitrogen discharge allowances by 
the Lake Taupo Protection Trust at a rate 
of $0.4 million per tonne.
Trading
There is substantial international evidence 
that demonstrates that water markets can 
reveal the value of water to existing and 
Coming decades will be characterised by 
increasing water scarcity and reduced reliability 
of water supply and quality in key catchments 
and regions, at the times of year and in the places 
where water is in highest demand.
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potential users, generating short-term 
incentives to use water more efficiently 
and longer-term incentives to shift water 
to higher-value uses. Water trading in 
the southern Murray-Darling Basin 
contributed over 2% to Australia’s GDP in 
2009. The total benefits were even greater 
within the southern Murray-Darling Basin 
itself, where water trading increased gross 
regional product by over $A370 million 
in that year, indicating that water trading 
maintained productive capacity within the 
southern Murray-Darling Basin, rather 
than shifting it to other areas of Australia.
In the New Zealand context, there may 
be only a few regions that will surpass 
limits for water takes and otherwise 
possess the prerequisites for trading. 
Trading has taken place in a number of 
regions experiencing water shortages, 
including Canterbury, Hawkes Bay and 
Otago, often as shares within irrigation 
schemes that have a single consent or 
bilaterally between farmers or brokers.
Charging
Water taxes have been successfully 
implemented in other jurisdictions with 
significant success. A study undertaken by 
the European Commission in 2011 found 
that volumetric charges on drinking and 
industrial water in the Netherlands and 
Cyprus have reduced consumption by 
between 8% and 40%, depending on user 
group (European Commission, 2011).
Six of 66 New Zealand local authorities 
meter and volumetrically charge across 
the whole of their jurisdictions,7 and an 
additional eight meter and volumetrically 
charge across parts of their jurisdictions.
Equity and distribution
Generally speaking, the most significant 
market benefits of water extraction 
and contamination accrue privately 
to businesses, like manufacturers and 
farms, which require water as an input to 
production or rely on the ability of water 
bodies to absorb contaminants that are by-
products of production processes. These 
firms have a significant incentive to secure 
consents to take and discharge to water. 
As a result, more passive recreational 
and cultural users, whose water use isn’t 
monetised or easily valued, have relatively 
less influence over the availability and 
quality of freshwater resources.
Decisions about policy for managing 
fresh water quality have implications 
for intergenerational equity, as some 
discharges take years or even decades to 
reach water bodies and affect the water’s 
quality, and costs incurred by current 
taxpayers may not realise water-quality-
state benefits for many years. Good 
planning now, which imposes lower-level 
costs over longer transition timelines, 
can avoid damage to water bodies which 
may be either too costly or impossible to 
correct in the future.
Climate change
New Zealand faces challenges and 
information barriers in reducing its 
greenhouse emissions and adapting 
to climate change. While the shape of 
international policy post-2020 remains 
unclear, it will be economically important 
that New Zealand contributes its ‘fair share’ 
of global mitigation in step with other 
countries and maintains its competitive 
advantage in those areas where our 
production is less emissions-intensive.
Introduction
As an island nation with a long coastline 
and an economy reliant on primary 
production, New Zealand is vulnerable to 
changes in the climate. While New Zealand 
may not be as severely affected by climate 
change as some countries, impacts may 
include an increased frequency and 
intensity of natural hazards and extreme 
events, such as floods, landslides droughts, 
hot days, storms and coastal erosion (Joshi 
et al., 2011; Ministry for the Environment, 
2008).
New Zealand emits only 0.2% of 
global greenhouse gas emissions. For this 
reason, our mitigation policies will be 
most effective in contributing to a global 
solution to the extent that they encourage 
larger-emitting nations to take action.
New Zealand faces significant 
challenges in reducing its greenhouse gas 
emissions. Nearly 50% of our emissions 
come from the agriculture sector, where 
fewer abatement options are available. 
The forestry sector has large potential for 
carbon sequestration in the short term, 
but carbon stored in wood products is 
emitted at or over time after harvest.
Our non-agricultural sectors are 
relatively carbon-efficient: New Zealand’s 
emissions intensity – emissions of fossil 
CO2  per unit of economic output – is 
close to the OECD mean and far below 
that of the rapidly developing Asian 
economies. New Zealand’s electricity 
is over 70% renewable, including 
hydroelectric, geothermal and wind 
power, and may reach nearly 90% 
renewable by 2040 (MBIE, 2013).
Transport-related emissions comprise 
a high proportion of our total emissions 
from fuel combustion relative to other 
countries and the OECD mean. There 
are currently few lost-cost emissions 
reduction options in the transport sector, 
and consumer demand tends to be more 
price-inelastic.8
Unlike many other developed nations, 
New Zealand has a growing population: 
between 1990 and 2009 the population 
rose by 30%, making New Zealand 
the second fastest-growing developed 
country. The population is expected to 
be have grown more than 60% from 1990 
by 2050 (Statistics New Zealand, 2009). A 
larger population drives increases in total 
emissions.
The nature of future international 
climate change commitments, and their 
New Zealand emits only 0.2% of global greenhouse 
gas emissions. For this reason, our mitigation 
policies will be most effective in contributing to a 
global solution to the extent that they encourage 
larger-emitting nations to take action.
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relation to domestic action, is unclear. 
Negotiations under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change have recently agreed that a global 
deal should be negotiated by 2015, to 
enter into force from 2020. New Zealand 
has recently announced a target to reduce 
emissions to 5% below 1990 levels by 
2020.
Opportunities do exist for 
New Zealand firms to realise lower-
carbon growth while staying globally 
competitive. Government and the private 
sector can tailor investments in energy 
and transportation infrastructure in 
coming decades towards lower-emitting 
outcomes. It may be possible to realise 
growth while avoiding emissions 
increases by making smarter, longer-view 
investment and research and development 
decisions in the short to medium term.
Fiscal sustainability
Both domestic greenhouse gas mitigation 
policies and international commitments 
to reduce emissions have financial 
implications, which are both driven by and 
in turn have an impact on New Zealand’s 
emissions profile. New Zealand’s emissions 
profile is cyclical as a result of our large 
plantation forestry industry: as forests 
grow they absorb or sequester carbon, and 
as they are harvested the carbon stored in 
the trees over their lifetime is released.
Domestic mitigation policies
New Zealand has already taken action in 
adopting and implementing the ETS. The 
ETS was designed to assist New Zealand 
in meeting international climate change 
commitments at least cost and to reduce 
New Zealand’s net emissions below 
business-as-usual levels by placing 
obligations on emitters to surrender units 
in relation to their emissions.
While the ETS is a useful tool for 
delivering international emissions 
reduction units, New Zealand’s limited 
low-cost mitigation potential effectively 
restricts the scheme’s ability to drive 
significant domestic emissions reductions. 
Economic modelling has shown that an 
increase in the price of carbon from $0 
to $25 may reduce gross emissions by 
only 6 million tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e) by 2040, or 5% below 
business as usual.9
The ETS can be calibrated to be 
fiscally neutral to the Crown over the 
long term. On this basis, emitters would 
surrender in aggregate no more than the 
number of units and/or cash necessary 
to satisfy New Zealand’s international 
commitments.
International commitments
When New Zealand made its commitment 
under the Kyoto Protocol, the commitment 
was treated as a financial liability 
equivalent to the difference between the 
total projected emissions over 2008–2012 
and the target level. New Zealand has 
recently committed to reducing emissions 
to 5% below 1990 levels by 2020, and this 
commitment will likely entail fiscal costs 
to the extent that our net emissions exceed 
the target over the period.
If ETS settings are attuned to deliver 
international commitments, climate 
change policy will be fiscally sustainable 
over the long term as business and 
consumers pay the emissions tab. 
However, this tax burden will have growth 
implications and associated longer-term 
fiscal implications, particularly in the 
event that New Zealand takes earlier, more 
aggressive action than its competitors.
Adaptation policy
As New Zealand’s emissions are such a low 
percentage of the global whole, it will not 
be possible for our actions to meaningfully 
decrease the probability of catastrophic 
events. In the long term, large-scale events 
entailing high global damages may impact 
on New Zealand economically and fiscally, 
suggesting the increasing importance 
of maintaining prudent debt levels and 
investing in resilient infrastructure.
The importance of the primary 
industries in New Zealand makes our 
economy relatively more susceptible to 
shifting weather patterns and changing 
climatic conditions, suggesting a need 
for better and more information on the 
likely impacts of climate change and early 
investment where viable infrastructural 
and preparedness options exist (Treasury, 
2002). Likewise, the proximity of 
significant infrastructural assets, urban 
centres and residential properties to the 
coastline gives rise to fiscal risks.
Economic growth and efficiency
Decisions about whether and how to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions have real 
implications for New Zealand’s economic 
growth, in both the short term and the 
longer term.
Studies have suggested that, at a 
global level, the benefits of strong, early 
action far outweigh the potential long-
term combined costs of climate change 
damage and mitigation required to 
avoid dangerous climate change (Clarke 
et al., 2009; Stern, 2006). In the context 
of concerted global action, under which 
developed and large-emitting developing 
economies alike provide comparable, clear 
incentives to their domestic industries to 
reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of 
production, ambitious climate change 
policy in New Zealand will encourage 
innovation, fuel economic growth, and 
ensure that our goods and services remain 
competitive in the global marketplace.
At present, however, concerted 
international action is still under 
negotiation. In this context, aggressive, 
unilateral policies will entail negative 
effects on productivity growth and income 
for developed countries in the short term, 
primarily as shifting human and capital 
Decisions about whether and how to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions have real implications 
for New Zealand’s economic growth, in both the 
short term and the longer term.
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resources to work on mitigation reduces 
the resources available for producing 
other goods and services (Garnaut, 2011; 
Mendelsohn, 2009; OECD, 2008).
The closer in step we are with 
competitors, the lesser the relative impact 
on our growth. Modelling has suggested 
that consistent action across the rest of 
the world reduces GDP impact relative 
to business-as-usual by between 30% 
and 50%, compared to a scenario under 
which New Zealand takes strong action 
to reduce emissions ahead of the rest 
of the world (Ballingal, Schilling and 
Stroombergen, 2011).
Equity and distribution
The distribution of the ETS tax burden 
will remain, in the near-term, highly 
differential by sector, as the ETS assigns 
varying degrees of responsibility for 
emissions to various industries, taking 
into account the availability and cost 
of mitigation options and exposure to 
international markets. This distribution is 
relevant within generations.
When designing and implementing 
climate change policies we must also 
consider the distribution of costs between 
generations. Early, ambitious action 
ahead of international competitors will 
be highly costly to current generations 
and may yield only marginal cost savings 
for future generations. Conversely, action 
that is behind international competitors 
could save costs now, but to the detriment 
of future generations.
Conclusion
New Zealand is wealthy in natural 
resources, and these resources will be a 
determinant of our social, cultural and 
economic development. Our resource 
endowment is very diverse and resources 
should be managed in ways that reflect 
this diversity.
In order to use and protect this natural 
resource advantage we need to:
• Know more about what resources we 
have. The more and better-detailed 
information we have about the 
resources we have, their current 
use and their future demand, the 
better able we will be to assess and 
value our natural capital stocks and 
flows, conduct an informed public 
debate on the use of our resources, 
and design effective management 
frameworks to protect and utilise 
them sustainably.
• Think carefully and creatively about 
how and when we use them. As non-
renewable resources are consumed 
and demand for renewable resources 
increases, we need to improve 
environmental management tools 
and financial mechanisms. These 
improvements will ensure resources 
flow to their highest-value uses 
and promote sustainable long-term 
growth.
1 The literature on ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ sustainability has 
introduced the concept of ‘critical natural capital’, or capital 
which performs important ecosystem services and that 
cannot be substituted for other types of non-natural capital 
(e.g. fresh water, climate, and soil). This natural capital may 
be considered non-renewable when its consumption or use 
surpasses a threshold, as its degradation beyond this point 
gives rise to exceptional economic, social or ecological costs 
(de Groot et al., 2003; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007).
2 It is often true that ascertaining the true and comprehensive 
value of natural resources can be difficult or impossible in 
practice, as the values derived are both market and non-
market values, which are sometimes in conflict with one 
another.
3 This analysis assumes $100 per tonne carbon dioxide (CO2).
4  The valuation of forecast royalties from future discoveries 
draws on a complex model of forecast future discoveries 
and production developed by the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment. The model performs a Monte 
Carlo analysis, using a number of probability-weighted inputs 
to generate several hundred scenarios, where each scenario 
sets out a unique forecast of the total producing fields in 
each of the eight frontier basins, their revenues, profits and 
royalties.
5 Valuations are derived using a discounted cash flow approach 
with a weighted average cost of capital of 8.89% for current 
basins and 11.85% for future discoveries. Estimates exclude 
any corporate tax revenue. Estimates for future discoveries 
based on the mid scenario with probabilities of 10%, 50% 
and 90% are combined according to Swanson’s Rule, which 
assumes constant or slightly reducing industry exploratory 
activity and slowly increasing petroleum prices. Six oil price 
paths and three gas price paths were applied; oil prices in 
2030 across the scenarios range from $US50 to $US200 
per barrel by 2030. Gas is assumed to be sold domestically 
in NZ dollars; oil is assumed to be sold internationally in US 
dollars at a long-run average exchange rate of 0.600.
6 Water availability is based on mean annual low flow (MALF), 
which assesses the surface water-level conditions during the 
driest part of the year and assumes that all allocated water 
is taken. The MALF is modelled for stream segments by 
NIWA, and the most downstream value in each catchment is 
assigned to the catchment. The consented water allocation 
includes consumptive surface water sources (i.e. it excludes 
storage, groundwater and non-consumptive takes), which 
captures 60% of all consented consumptive allocation in 
New Zealand in 2010.
7 These are Whangarei District, Auckland Council, Tauranga 
City, Carterton District, Nelson City and Tasman District.
8 Note that these costs are technology-dependent and that 
technological breakthrough could significantly decrease the 
costs of abatement and increase the economic viability of 
various mitigation options.
9 Emissions projections sourced from the Ministry for the 
Environment; assumptions include AR4 global warming 
potential values and central GDP, oil price and exchange rate 
forecasts.
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